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Use https for update checks and verify hash of downloaded executable #4716
Comments
Comment 1 by jteh on 2015-01-12 09:16 |
Comment 2 by James Teh <jamie@... on 2015-01-13 07:47
Changes:
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Comment 3 by leonarddr on 2015-01-14 08:08 |
Comment 5 by nvdakor on 2015-01-14 18:14 |
Comment 6 by nvdakor on 2015-01-15 01:26
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Comment 7 by jteh (in reply to comment 6) on 2015-01-15 03:07
Thanks for the research. The issues you mentioned relate to a custom certificate location on Unix or self-signed certificates. Neither of these is the case here. However, the lack of intermediate certificates on our server as discussed in #4803 could be the problem. I've fixed this now, so I'm awaiting feedback on #4803. |
Comment 8 by James Teh <jamie@... on 2015-01-16 07:11
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Comment 9 by James Teh <jamie@... on 2015-01-16 07:59
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Comment 10 by James Teh <jamie@... on 2015-01-30 05:25
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Comment 11 by jteh on 2015-01-30 05:26 |
…date information is retrieved via https and the hash of the file is verified after it is downloaded.) Fixes #4716.
Reported by jteh on 2014-12-20 01:23
Now that Python 2.7.9 verifies https certificates, we should move to using https for update checks. This will prevent MITM attacks for update checks. We should also include a hash for the executable in the update check response and verify it once downloaded to prevent MITM attacks for the download itself.
This requires changes in both NVDA and the server.
Blocked by #4715
Blocking #4803
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